

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75  
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE

1963

Fishing efforts have expanded enormously in the last 15 years. We do not know, generally speaking, whether there is a condition of overfishing now. There may be. What we do know is that it may rapidly approach. Indeed, I am confident the time is now when the maritime nations of the world must get together and must join in research and in appropriate conservation measures, lest these resources, which otherwise can be made renewable forever, will have totally disappeared.

#### THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, resumed the consideration of Executive M (88th Cong., 1st sess.), the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I would like at this time to express my strong support of the test ban treaty and my hope that this treaty will receive an overwhelming vote of ratification from the Senate.

The U.S. Government has advocated this type of treaty in negotiations with the Soviet Union since 1959. It has been proposed by two administrations, endorsed by the national platforms of both political parties, and supported by Americans of all political persuasion.

The treaty was finally negotiated last month because the Russian Government made to the United States a significant concession. Our Government made no concession from its previous position. The Russians abandoned their insistence on tying the test ban to a broader agreement on disarmament, without inspection safeguards satisfactory to us.

Mr. President, to reject the treaty under these circumstances would be to reject the approach our military and civilian leaders have urged toward disarmament over the last 10 years. We have been told by all our leaders that disarmament must be negotiated from a position of strength rather than weakness, for only if this were so, would our adversary be willing to make those concessions necessary for our protection. Many hundreds of billions of dollars have been spent to build up this type of strength. Now, when we have finally reached a position of clear military superiority, when we finally have the strength necessary to force concessions—as we did in these negotiations—how can we turn our backs on our own policies?

The only reason that would justify a rejection of this policy would be that the treaty as written dissipated our strength or endangered our security. I am not a military expert. But I accept the judgment of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the CIA, the Director of AEC, and the Director of Research and Development of the Department of Defense, that this treaty does not endanger our security. We have, as well, the commitment of the President that our weapons development will continue and that our atomic laboratories and testing grounds will be held at the ready so that testing can resume if our national security demands it.

I am also sure that one of the reasons for widespread public support and confidence in this treaty was the fact that it was negotiated by Averell Harriman, who has dealt with the Soviet Union longer than any other public figure in this country; who was the first to warn of the danger after the war; and who has become, over the years, the symbol of the hard, skeptical approach toward doing business with the Russians.

Mr. President, the Russians have their own reasons for wanting this agreement, as we have ours. We do not know whether there is a direct relation between the new Soviet attitude and their differences with the Chinese. Russia has withdrawn aid for Chinese nuclear development. The two nations have cut trade severely. They denounce each other publicly almost every day. The Russians have given aid to India, China's enemy. The Chinese have accused the Russians of plotting to recognize Formosa, and of encouraging open rebellion among minority groups in the north of China.

The significance of this can be seen if we consider, that if any one of these incidents had occurred between our Nation and, say, Great Britain, it would have been considered a most serious crisis.

These developments in the Communist world are partly the result of our strong and firm policies in recent years—a result of our military buildup, our world leadership and our willingness to stand up to the Communists regardless of the risk. The Russians have failed in Berlin, in the Congo, in the Middle East and elsewhere. These failures have shaken their hold on their Empire. Russia has been forced to make concessions to us to keep support of its satellites. In this situation, which can only evolve to our advantage, it would be a grave mistake to align ourselves with the Chinese against the limited test ban.

If we cannot arrive at a modest agreement like this, under present world circumstances, I do not know when we can. The overwhelming opinion of the people of my State is that this test ban agreement is an act of mercy, and that by this act we will earn the gratitude of the people of the world for freeing them from the twin threat of fallout and possible nuclear destruction, but that if we do not approve this treaty, our Nation will be singled out before all the world as the nation which fastened these chains on mankind.

This is a viewpoint that has been reflected in the distinguished publication of the Catholic Archdiocese of Boston, the Pilot, and in newspaper editorials in leading newspapers in Boston, Worcester, Haverhill, and Lynn. I ask unanimous consent that these editorials be inserted at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Pilot, official organ of the Archdiocese of Boston, Mass., Aug. 3, 1963]

#### SUMMER THAW

"Prohibit, to prevent and not to carry out any nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion."

In such direct and simple words the re-

cent Moscow agreement was drawn up by representatives from the United States, Russia, and Great Britain. The document on the nuclear test ban in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater was refreshing for brevity in days when extended remarks have a habit of finding their way into any written or spoken word. Some are of the mind that the whole thing is too simple and the innocents should beware lest it blow up in their faces. Others who do not share this suspicion, but who have their own reservations on Russian pacts, take a more hopeful view of the matter.

Let more be read into the wording of the agreement than was intended, it was quickly pointed out that "any other nuclear explosion" did not preclude use of these frightening weapons in wartime, nor did it forbid testing underground. For the latter, the United States wanted international inspection of sites, a condition to which the Russians would not agree because they felt this was merely a cover for spying.

Short as the meat of the agreement may be, it will be carefully analyzed before it is fully digested. Even though Mr. Rusk and his bipartisan group leave this weekend for the formal signing of the treaty, the whole business must be ratified by the Senate. The Members of this body are the ones charged with this responsibility by the Constitution and it is they who must ultimately answer to the American people. Already the President has called for a debate on the subject, and this debate is to involve all Americans, since this is a matter in the national interest.

Death is the lot of man, but the very thoughts of annihilation, which is what the thermonuclear arsenals of both East and West may hold, should be enough to make men and nations take any steps in the direction of peace. We are no longer at the point of killing by way of overcoming an unjust invader; we have reached and long passed what has been so technically and politely called overkilling.

We are not anxious to cast aside security or military power for tainted promises. On the other hand, we are anxious to explore the avenues of peace in terms of modern challenges to our national welfare. The test ban treaty may suggest to many a rocky road, but even that can take us out of the sure path of destruction.

[From the Pilot, official organ of the Archdiocese of Boston, Mass., Aug. 10, 1963]

#### A CHANGE OF DIRECTION

Within 10 days of signing the nuclear test ban agreement we will be marking the 18th anniversary of the atomic blast at Hiroshima. If it is a time of promise, it is also surely a time for reflection.

The limited test ban treaty does not either outlaw the bomb nor does it make further testing impossible. Those who have signed it have, however, set their faces in a new direction and it is the direction of less terror rather than more, less destruction, rather than more, less danger rather than more, toward survival and against annihilation. Perhaps it is only a step, as everyone seems to say, but it is an about face, at least psychologically, and this is the most important thing of all.

We do not like to reflect on the Hiroshima anniversary; it was an unpleasant (at least) moment in our history. But the treaty just signed makes it possible for us to feel that we can manage somehow to face the day this year; up until now we cringed before it. The dread decision that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki has not yet been repudiated by the bulk of Americans; the set of our minds is not much different from what it was in 1945. In other words, we could do it again. But the treaty gives us reason to hope that change is in the winds.